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THEWELFARE ECONOMICS OF MORAL HAZARD
ABSTRACT
Thispaper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive
equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section
compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a
fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the
subsequent sections focuses on a particular market failure,
Richard Arnott Joseph Stiglitz
Boston College Stanford University
Carney 247 Department of Economics
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 Stanford, CA 94305It is now widely recognized that the phenomenon of moral hazard,which
arises whenever risk-averse individuals obtain insurance and theiraccident-
avoidance activities cannot be perfectly monitored, ispervasive in the
economy.' Since individuals do not bear the full consequences of their
actions, incentives for accident avoidance tend to be Less than ifthey did.
This, in itself, does not imply that the market is (constrained)
inefficient; to establish inefficiency, it needs to be shown that there is
some intervention in the economy which would lead to a Pareto improvement.
The object of this paper is to show that,,in general, whenever moral hazard
is present, market equilibrium is indeed "potentially" inefficient (i.e.
assumingno costs of government intervention),The inefficiencies
associatedwithmarket equilibrium with moral hazard take on a number of
different forms, and this paper provides a taxonomy of these market
failures.
Such a taxonomy is useful for several reasons. First, it helps in
identifyingdifferent forms of government intervention which might yield
Pareto improvements. Secondly, several of the inefficiencies which we
identify in decentralized market economies can be thought of as
externalities. There is a strong presumption that market economies respond
tothe existence of externalities by attempting to internalize them. Our
analysis thus provides some insights into patterns of market structure which
are otherwise difficult to explain, and, in the process of identifying the
various forms of inefficiencies associated with moral hazard, enables us toascertain the circumstances in which market solutions' -- internalizingthe
informational externalities -- aremore likely to be effective. Finally.
the literature has identified certain limiting cases in whichequilibrium is
efficient. Our analysis helps to understand why these limitingcases are so
special.
One of Arrow's great contributions was to show that thetraditional
competitive analysis, and hence the basic welfare theorems, can be extended
to treat uncertainty, provided there is a complete set of insurance markets.
The markets in which we are interested differ from Arrow-Debreu markets in
an important way. Those markets provide insurance against states of
nature, the occurrence of which is unaffected (by definition) by
individuals' actions. Most insurance, however is for events (like
hospitalization), the likelihood of which is affected by individuals'
actions.2
Traditional results on the efficiency of market economies can be
obtained even when the insured-against events are endogenous, solong as
individuals' accident-prevention activities are observable. Inefficiencies
ens, only when neither the exogenous states of nature nor the individuals'
accident-prevention activities are observable.
The fact that moral hazard alters the nature of market equilibrium has
long been recognized. With moral hazard and complete insurance,3
individuals have no incentive to avoid the accident; hence competitive
markets typically entail incomplete insurance. But the existence of
incomplete insurance does not imply that the market is necessarily Pareto
inefficient, ziven the informational problems which are at the core of the
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2moral hazard problem, One might argue (as Shavell [1979] andPauly [1974],
and several other authors have) that a competitive insurance firm takes into
account how the level of insurance it provides affects the accident
avoidance of those it insures and efficiently balances this against the
benefits of risk reduction. This argument, as attractiv, as it has beento
those who believe that markets must be efficient, is simplywrong. The
expected profitability of an insurance contract depends on the actions taken
by the insured, which are affected by his purchase of other commodities and
other insurance (his savings, his income. etc.) all of which depend on
prices. In an Arrow-Debreu economy, the externalities that such dependency
on prices gives rise to do not cause inefficiency.4 When moral hazard is
present, however, we shall show that they do, and hence that competitive
equilibrium ii inefficient.
In earlier works, we showed that the nature of market equilibrium with
moral hazard depends critically on whether the quantity of insurance which
the individual purchases is or is not observable. In both cases, market
equilibria are inefficient, but the nature of the inefficiencies and the
potential role of the government differ. This paper focuses on the case
wherethe quantity of insuranceisobservable, In that case, we know that
the equilibrium is characterized by a single firmproviding the individual
all of his insurance for a particular accident (see Arnott and Stiglitz
(1987]).'
The basic source of the externalities is that if individuals take more
care, some of the benefits from reduced accidents accrue to the insurance
firm, not to the individual. If only one individual takes more care, his
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3reduced accident probability will not be reflected in his premium; when all
individuals take more care, they will be. Hence, policy interventions
which increase care for all individual,s -- providedthey do not cost too
much --aredesirable,
We can, accordingly, classify market failures by the avenuethrough
which accident-avoidance activities are influenced. Accident avoidance
may
be affected by purchases of goods, which in turnare affected by prices.
Firms, in setting their prices, fail, to take this into account. Thiswe
callthe pecuniary externalities market failure.
Accident avoidance also depends on individuals' income in different
states. And individuals' incomein different states depends on the
insuranceprovided bydifferent firms,including insurance provided against
seemingly unrelated risks. Thus, the insurance which one firm providesmay
affect the profitabilityof insurance contracts offered by other firms
againstother risks.Associated with this is the seeminzly unrelated events
market failure.
Accident avoidanc, at date t is affected by wealth (and other state
variables such as health) at dats t; and this is affected by insurance
provided in both prior and subsequent years. This is trueevenif
accidentsat different dates areindependent events. Here a wealth or
income effect gives rise to a seemingly unrelated events market failure.
Oneofthe central implications of the efficiency of market economies
is that cross-subsidies are not required. The fact that the amountof
insurance purchased for one (seemingly unrelated) accident affects care in
another suggests that there maybeinstances where itpaysfor one insurance
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4policy to be taxed, to crass-subsidize another. This turns out in fact to
be the case. That cross subsidies are not provided in Competitive
equilibrium causes the cross-subsidization market failure.
We establish these market failures using the followinggeneral
approach. We first set up the optimization problem of the planner
attempting to attain Pareto efficient outcomes and compare these with the
market equilibrium. The planner, it turns out, takes intoaccount certain
termswhichthe market ignores, and while the market faces zeroprofit
constraints for each firm,theplanner has only an aggregate feasibility
constraint. The shadow prices on goods derived in the planning problemturn
out to differ from market prices, which implies the (potential)desirability
of commodity taxation. And since the shadow prices on profits of different
firms will, typically differ, cross subsidies are in general desirable.
The general approach allows us to identify the limiting cases where
market equilibrium is Pareto efficient. The expressions characterizing
market equilibrium and Pareto efficiency turn out to be identical when
certain behavioral responses are absent, i.e. certain derivatives are zero.
By focusing on special, cases of our general model, we obtain insights into
thehighly unusual conditions under which these behavioral responses do not
appear, Unfortunately, much ofthe earlier literature, attempting to
establish the efficiency of market economies, focused precisely on those
special cases, for instance, where there is a single consumption good and a
single accident, and where each individual purchases all of his insurance
from a single competitive insurer,'
The paper is divided into four sections. The next section sets up the
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5general model, while the following sections examine in greater detail
several of the market failures we have identified.
1. A Fairly General Kodel
There is a group of individuals identical in all, respects8
,facedwith
the possibility of several mutually exclusive outcomes or events,9iE[.
Each event may affect an individual's welfare directly and/or result in the
Loss of a given bundle of consumer goods, d. It is assumed thatan
individual receives utility from one vector of consumer goods that he
purchases prior to the outcome, ,andanother vector of consumer goods
that he purchases subsequent to the outcome,c ,anddisutility from
various types of accident-prevention effort, e i.e., utility with outcome
iis given by
—u1C,&1-d1, e) . (1.1)
The probability of each outcome depends on both Z and e
Pt —p(Z,e)
. (1.2)
The individual is assumed to supply a fixed quantity of labor, as well
as a fixed number of units of non-labor factors of production. Theeconomy
is large, and different individuals' outcome probabilities are independent.
Thus, there is no aggregate uncertainty. Furthermore, it is assumed that
there are constant returns to scale in production, and that production is
competitively organized. As a result, with labor income as numéraire, the




6expressed as a function of producer prices, r •i.e.
—(r) (1.3)
The individual's before-insurance income is therefore
x —1+r(r) . (1.4)
It is assumed that insurers can observe neither an individual's effort
nor his total purchase of various commodities. This is the source of moral.
hazard. As a result, insurance policies cannot be based on these
magnitudes. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is a separate
insurance policy for each outcome. For a subset of these outcomes, id'
we assume that insurance purchases are observable, in which case (see Arnott
and Stiglitz (1987]) exclusive insurance contracts specify both the quantity
of insurance the individual is to purchase and its price: equivalently,
policy i is characterized by $ ,thepremium, and -y ,thegross (of
the contract's own premium) payout. For the remaining outcomes, il/t' ,an
individual's total insurance purchases are not observable, and we assume
that the individual can purchase as much insurance as he wants at the price
(premium/gross payout ratio) 9. Thus, where is the net insurance




Also, the expected profits of the ithinsurancepolicy are
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7—J $1-yp for itt'
(1 6) - ;p1for itt/I'
Hence, the total expected profits of all policies together are
r—S —S fl+S -S'yp —- Spz
itt itI itt/I' itt itt (1.7)
To be consistent with earlier assumptions about the composition of
individuals' incomes and to keep the model general equilibrium in nature,
these insurance profits accrue to the governmentJ°
We assume that transactions, but not individuals' total purchases, of
goods are observable. This allows linear, but not non-Linear, commodity
taxation. Where q denotes the vector of consumer prices, from (1.4) and
(1.5), the individual's budget constraint with outcome j is
x+z4 —l÷;(r) +-y -S -S;# —+&
. (1.8)
itt' id/I'
The individual maximizes expected utility subject to his outcome-contingent
budget constraints, i.e.
— itax Eli —S
e •c,(c ), (-y ) ,itI
(1.9)
subject to (1.8), the outcome-dependent budget constraints.
Thus, using obvious vector notation,
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8— Z(r,-y.$.8,q) , — a(r,,,fl,9,q)for jet
e—.(r,i,fi,9,q) , EU—V(r.,$,S.q),and (1.. 10)
—7(r.7,fl,8,q)for hi/I'
where ydenotesthe vector of for Let' .iffi, •qand y are
fixed, then r is determined by market-clearing in the goods, factor, and
insurance markets. Hence we nay write
r —r(-y,$.#.q) . (1.11)
Total expected tax revenue is
t —(-)Z t Ep(-)& . (1.12)
iii
The feasibility constraint for the economy is that
(1.13)




T —T(r(-y,fl,#.q),,fl,S,q) . (1.14c)




9max 2 —V(r(,),,)+A[ Sr(rOt)q) +t(r(q),)]. (1.15)
'7 ut
thefirst-order conditions of which areL2
p+[E+W]+z[W+A[z+J]io
(a) (b) (ci) (a2) (a,) (1.16)
where L is the set of all. commodities (i.e. includes both and
commodities).
This needs to be contrasted with the market equilibrium (assuming it
exists), in which each competitive insurance firm can be viewed as providing
a single policy, choosing the parameters of the policy to maximize the
individual's expected utility subject to its at least breaking even, and
taking the vector of producer prices and the parameters of all other
insurance contracts as given. The competitive equilibrium can be shown to
be the solution to the following set of equations:
q —r(i.fl,8,q) (1.17)
i.e. consumer prices equal producer prices; in the normal case (see Arnott
and Stigl.itz [1981] for a discussion of the other cases)
0 (1.18)
for price insurance contracts (i.e. ia/I') ,whichcan be shown to imply
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LOthat the private marginal utility of income must be the same for all
outcomes covered by price insurance contracts; and
av+A y—
— 0 + A4 —0 (1.19)
for quantity-constrained insurance policies, where A3is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the jth insurance firm's profit constraint.
Comparing (1.16) with (1.17) -(1.19).we can see the major sources of
market failure noted in the introduction. The market ignores: (a) the
effect of a change in the terms of the policy (or a price) on profits of
other policies; (b) the effect of the change on tax revenues; (c) the effect
of the change on producer prices, and the consequent effect on utility.
either directly, or indirectly through the effect on producer and insurance
profits and on tax revenues. We now describe each of these market failures
more fully.
a. The insurance externality with quantity rationin2
In general, the quantity of insurance purchased for the jtK outcome
affects the actions individuals undertake, which affect the likelihood of
the occurrence of other events and hence the insurance profits for all other
outcomes (as well as profits in other industries). The competitive firm
ignoresthis, while the social planner takes it into account.
Formally, this can be seen in the comparison between (1.19) and (1.16).
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Theeffect with which we are concerned here arises when r is constant and






The distortion arises from the effect of insurance on other insurance firms'





To emphasize the fact that this arises even when the events which are being
insured are apparently unrelated, we refer to this as the "seemingly
unrelated events market failure.
b. Thepecurtjarv externalities market failure
(1.16) also suggests thatitmay in general be desirable to imposea
taxon the commodities purchased. To see this, consider the case in which
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12producer prices are constant. Then, from (116). in the absence of
commodity taxes,
at av at ———+A E —+—
eq2 8q2 iii 8q2 8q2
q—r
From the individual's maximization problem. (1.9),
8V
—-
where is the individual's marginal utility of income under event








Thus,if A —forall i andZi—— 0.itis not optimal to tax




— api 871 - +(°
-p1)—forid/I'
which is not in general equal to zero. Thus, it appears generally desirable
to taxorsubsidize commodities which affect accident probabilities, because
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13of their direct and indirect effects on accident-avoidance activities and
the consumption of commodities which directly affect the likelihood of an
accident. That this is indeed the case is demonstrated in Arnott and
Stiglitz [19861.
c. The income effect
In the previous subsection, producer prices, and hence incomes, were
held constant. In general, a change in ,fi , 9and q will affect
producer prices and hence profits. These changes in profits will affect
care, and hence will have further repercussions on profits in the insurance
industry. This effect, captured in (1.16) by terms in ôrj/ö is
obviously neglected by the insurance firminchoosing its profit-maximizing
contract, and is a second source of pecuniary externalities.
d.The insurance externality without quantityrationina
Though thegovernment cannot directly control the quantity of insurance
chatthe individual, purchases against those outcomes for which individual
total insuranc, coverage is unobservable, it can affect the quantity
purchased by taxing such insurance -Thiswill reduce the inefficiencies
stemming from the inadequate precautions taken as a result of excessive
insurance purchased against those outcomes. To isolate this effect, set T







8w 8p —- I +I— ( - p)
.From(1.16), at the









apt — (AIpe)y3- A
id id 4
which will not in general equal zero.
e. No cross-subsidization
to isolate this market failure, ignore taxes. The marketequilibrium
generates non-negative profits for the insurance policies covering each
outcome. If the government were constrained to at least break even in each
policy rather than on all policies together, (1.15) would become
max 2— V(r(q),,p) + Aw1 (r(q),q), and since A3 0Ain general,
II
a Pareto improvement could be made by transferring fundsfromone insurance
policy to another.
Thecareful reader at this point may be wondering: Some of these
effects arise in the classic competitive economy, but do not give rise to
inefficiency there. The actions taken by one firm may affect producer
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LSprices, and hence the profits faced by other fins, but inefficiency does
not result; and firms face separate budget constraints but there is no
cross-subsidization market failure. In the remaining sections, we explain
why these effects give rise to market failure when moral hazard is present.
even though they do not when it is absent, and provide some insightinto the
natureand direction of the biases generated by moral-hazard. induced
inefficiencies. Our discussion below focuses on three of the market
failure., the seemingly unrelated events market failure, the cross-
subsidization market failure, and pecuniary externalities market failures
arising from income effects. In three companion papers (Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1986, l988c, l988d], we describe in greater detail the other
-marketfailures.
2.Seemingly Unrelated Events Market Failure
In a previous paper (Arnott and Stiglitz (19871) in which there was a
single fixed-damage accident and insurance policies were observable, we
showed that competitive equilibrium entails exclusive contracts- -each
individual purchases all his insurance from a single firm(seeFootnote 6).
Since there are manyfirms offeringsuch policies, exclusivity is consistent
with competitiveness. Here we extend that result to show that when there are
several risks and insurance policies are observable, an individual should
have all his insuranceneedsserved by a single firm,evenwhen the risks
areseemingly unrelated; we term this "extended exclusivity".
In the previous section, we argued that the actions of a firm offering
insurance against one type of accident generally affect the profits of firms
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16offering insurance against other types of accident. Exclusivity is required
to internalize these externalities. We did not, however, prove that each
firm's actions affect the profitability of other firms, nor did we
investigate the direction of the biases introduced by these inefficiencies.
We do so in this section.
That there areimportantinteractions among different risks seems
clear: An individual who drinks excessively will have a higher likelihood
of an automobile accident and a higher likelihood of hospitalization.
Increasing the degree of hospitalization insurance means that the magnitude
of an individual's total losses from drinking will be reduced, and hemay
therefore be induced to drink more, increasing the automobile accident rate
and lowering profits of automobile insurance. In this case, there would be
a negative externality- -themarket would be characterized by excessive
hospitalization insurance (and by symmetry) excessive automobile insurance.
¶.that is not so apparent, however, is that even when there is apparently
no relation between the events (and the accident-avoidance activities),
there is an interdependence. Not surprisingly, the effects are complicated,
and it is not an easy task to sign them. Though the calculations are
complex, the analytic approach we take is simple: We ascertain the effect
of a change in insurance against one accident on the likelihood of the
occurrence of other accidents; that is, we calculate the derivative of the
probability of accident J with respect to the tens of insurance against
accident i; so long as this derivative is not zero, the market equilibrium
is inefficient.
to simplify the discussion, we consider a world in which there are only
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17two types of fixed-daaage accident, I and 2. There are four possible
outcomes:no accident, accident 1. accident 2, and both accidents. Suppose
that a representative competitive insurance firm I provides insurance
against accident 1, and a representative competitive insurance firm 2
against accident 2.To simplify further, we assume that there is a single
commodity, the consumption of which has no effect on accident probabilities.
The probabilities of the accidents depend only on the levels of various
types of accident-prevention effort.
There are three avenues through which a budget-balancing perturbation
of firm l's contract can affect the profitability of firm 2.Firs:, one or
more of the types of accident-prevention effort may directly affect (i.e.,
enter the probability-of-accident functions for) both accidents.' Suppose
firm I offers more insurance. This will affect the effort levels chosen by
the individual, which will affect the probability of accident 2 and hence
the profitability of firm 2.Second, even when the various types of
accident-prevention effort are accident-specific, the level of one type of
effort may affect the marginal disutility of other types of effortLS and
hence the levels of these other types of effort that the individual chooses.
When firm 1 offers more insurance, this may affect the marginal, disutility
of a type of effort that influences the profitability of firm 216 Third,
even with neither of these effects operative, an increase in the provision
of insuranc, against one accident may make the individual more or less
complacent and careless in preventing the other because it affects the
differences in average marginal utilities between those states where the
accident does and does not occur. The nature of this effect depends
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18critically on the correlations between the two accidents, as we shall
shortly see.
The first two avenues, discussed above, through which the contract
offered by firm 1 can affect the profitability of firm 2. are obvious. We
shall therefore model only the last, Let j—l,2 index both the firm and
accident type, and i index the outcome with:i —0 •noaccident; 1. —1
accident 1 ; i —2,accident 2 ; and I —3 •bathaccidents. Corresponding
to each accident, there is a single unobservable, accident-specific type of
accident-prevention effort e
To simplify the algebra, we assume that there Is complete symmetry
between the two accidents. Let —P(e)be the probability of accident
j •with r <0 p.> 0 •andp be the probability of outcome i





Theparameter U captures the correlation between the accidents; U — 0
corresponds to mutually exclusive accidents, U —Ito statistically
independent accidents, and U >1to positively-correlated accidents.
The expected utility function has the special form
3 2
EU— E u(y1)p1 -Zs . (2.2)
i—O j—l
where y1 is net-of-insurance income (consumption) with outcome I •We
term this a separable, event-independent expected utility function--event-
Arnott/Stiglitz: Welfare Economics
February, 1989
19independent since the accidents do not affect the utility function directly.
Note that since the effort types are accident-specific the first
avenue of interdependence is excluded. Since the marginal disutility of
each effort type is independent of the level of the other effort type, the
second avenue of interdependence is excluded too.
Firm I and firm 2 both offer quantity-constrained contracts of the form
(a 'fi)where is the net (of premium) insurance payout if accident j




'—w-$1-d+a2 y3 —w- dia1 -
wherew is the individual's pre-insurance income when an accident does not
occur, and d is the size of the fixed-damage accident. -
Thefirst-order conditions of the individual's effort choice decision
ate
[(l-flP)(u. 'u0) +flP3(u3-u)]F'.
—Ij,j'—l,2; j"j' . (2.4)
We assume an interior solution, which may be written as
e —e11a2•$11$2) j—l,2. (2.5)
Expected utility (substituting (2.5) into (2.2)) is
EU —V(aL,aa,$L,flz)
- (2.6)






20Firm j must at least break even on policy j and takes a,, and fi,
asgiven. Where is the multiplier on the first-order conditions
are
aV aB By 8B
(2.8)
Toascertain whether competitive equilibrium entails over- or under-
provision of insurance, we perform the following exercise: We ask if a
budget-balancing increase in insurance offered by firm I in the neighborhood
of the competitive equilibrium, holding firm2'scontract fixed, stimulates
or discourages the effort expended by the individual to prevent accident 2.
If the increase stimulates e2 ,thenthe social benefit from the increase
exceeds the private benefit, and it is desirable that firm 1 offer more
insurance; hence, competitive equilibrium entails under-insurance. Let
de2— denotethe change induced from an increase in a1holding a2
6
and $constant,but allowing fltochange to maintain budget balance.
Then
de1 8e2 8e2 dfl1 > under-insurance
3
—7 + —j < 0•over-insurance
- (2,9)
4fl





21de2 802 8e2d$1 a —roa; V
(2.10)
ae 8e
and are obtained from total differentiation of (2.4), while
a1 p1
is obtained from (2.2). Where P —?—
P2and u. • —








where A >0from the second-order conditions of the individual's effort-
choice problem.
We shall consider two special cases.






since u -u>0(with moral hazard, insurance is only partial, which
implies that y0 >y2)and r'> 0 .Thus,with mutually exclusive
accidents, the competitive equilibrium entails underinsurance. The reason
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22for this is as follows: With mutually exclusive accidents, p0 —I- -
p2 P1 —P1 Pz — andp3 —0 •andfrom (2.4), the first-order
condition for e2 is
-(u0-u2) P-1 —0
In deciding on e2 -theindividual will, compare the utility in the no-
accident event with that in the accident 2 event (since e2 does not affect
the probability of accident 1). The increase in insurance against accident
1 decreases y0 and y2 by the same amount (recall (2.3)). Because of













The second term in the curly brackets is unambiguously positive (since
(P')3 <0and u3 -2u.+u0 < 0(concavity of u)), while the first term
is positive if absolute risk aversion is constant or increasing over the
relevantrange ((u)2
-uu>0—21nu tlnu +1nu lnu'
y0 +y3
is concave in y (since y2 —y1—
2—constantor increasing
absolute risk aversion). Hence,there is a presumption that the market also
under-provides insurance in the case of statistically independent accidents.




The general point is that an increase in the amount of insurance
provided by a firm against one type of accident will, by altering the
marginal utilities of income of several outcomes, affect the marginal
benefit of effort, and hence the effort level chosen, in preventing other
accidents. As a result, insurance firms generate external effects that can
be internalized if each individual purchases all his insurance from one
agent- -theextended exclusivity requirement for efficiency. If individuals
purchase different types of insurance from different firms, the market will
be inefficient, but the direction of bias--what types of accident the market
will, over-insure and what types it will under-insure- -isin general
ambiguous, depending in a complex way on such factors as the correlation
between the accidents, the risk-aversion properties of the utility function,
and the characteristics of the accident-prevention technology.
c.Dynamic interactions
Thus far, we have discussed different types of risk at a point in time.
The rule that exclusivity is a necessary condition for efficiency applies as
well to the provision of insurance against the same type of risk and
different types of risk over time. Thus, not only should an individual's
insurance needs be served by a single insurance agent at a point in time,
but the individual should also have the same insurance agent through time.
This is an important implication of our analysis. For most types of risks.
the probability of accident depends on the value of some imoerfectlv
observable'5 stock or state variables- -weight, state of health, education,
Arnott/Stiglitz: Welfare Econoeics
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are influenced by the amount of insurance provided through time. An agent
who provides insurance over only part of the insured's Life will neglect the
effect of the insurance he provides on the value ofthese stockvariables.
and hence on accident probabilities, before and after the period in which he
is the insurer.
traditional theories have stressed the importance of precautionary
savings. Since these savings are not earmarked, they serve to "insure"
simultaneously against all risks. The provision of greater market
insurance against some risk (say fire) reduces the need for savings; but at
reduced level of savings, individuals will tend to take greater care (at
fixed leveLs of insurance) against other risks. With this effect, an
increase in insurance against one risk will nonalLy have a positive effect
on the profitability of insurance against other risks, which implies that
precautionary savings lead to under-insurance.
An extended example of thesedynamic externalities isprovided by
Arnott and Stiglitz [1985].
d. The seetinely unrelated events market failure.
Since we have assumed that there are no administrative costs in the
provision of insurance and that individuals are perfectly informed
concerningthemenuof contractsbeing offered, competition should result in
extendedexclusivity- -a firm which offers the socially optimal exclusive
contract covering all ofone individual's insurance needs throughout his
lifewould drive all otherfirms out of business. Assume, more
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25realistically, that insurance administrative costs are characterized by
diseconomies of scope, so that competition will result in each firm
specializing in the provision of only a subset of types of insurance.
Moreover, for a variety of reasons, intertemporal. exclusivity is unlikely;
individuals would have to sign up at birth with an insurance fin that would
cover them for all risks (even those which, at the tie, they are not fully
aware of) throughout their lives, regardless of where they subsequently
choose to live or the occupation or lifestyle they decide to pursue. In
either of these cases, the externalities we have identified in this section
would be present. Not only would the market over- or under-provide
insurance, but also insurance fins would in general be over- or under-
specialized. Thus, we have identified a genuine potential market failure.
The inefficiency arises when accidents are related, but since its appearance
is most surprising when the accidents appear unrelated, we ten it the
seemintly unrelated events market failure.
In fact, individuals do obtain insurance from a variety of sources;
typically, one obtains market insurance from more than one carrier; and if
one is sick, one usually gets compensated sick leave from work and medical
care that is subsidized by the government.
Whether insurance markets are well-described by a competitive model
such astheone we have presented is moot, but whatever the market
structure, in the absence of extended exclusivity, the seemingly unrelated
events market failure is present.
3. The Cross-Subsidization Inefficiency
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between firms are needed. Consider two constant returns industries
producing consumer goods. Assume that an infinitesimal specific tax is
imposed on consumer good i ,andthat the revenues are used to finance a
subsidy on good j.Good j's price is lowered, and is price is raised;
the gain on one account is just equal to the loss on the other. There are,
of course, further repercussions: consumption of other goods, supply of
labor, etc. will, all change. But since all individuals are maximizing
their utility, these adjustments have second-order welfare effects (because
of the envelope theorem), and any consequent price changes have, at most.
redistributive effects. Any subsidies/taxes that are not infinitesimal
have further distortionary effects, and are welfare-reducing.
In contrast, with moral hazard, cross-subsidization is in general
desirable. The basic idea is that the transfer of a dollar from one firmto
another will alter the general equilibrium of the economy, including
individuals' effort levels and hence the "deadweight loss" associated with
moral, hazard (i.e. the loss relative to the equilibrium in which effort is
observable). The taxonone insurance policy leads to a prico increase, a
decrease in the quantityofinsurance purchased, and an increase in
accident-avoidance effort against that risk. The subsidy on the other
insurance policy has qualitatively the opposite effects. These effort
effects will not in general be offsetting. There may, of course, be other
general equilibrium effects, for instance on the prices of various
commodities and the levels of consumption, but (apart from any further
induced effects on effort) these have second-order welfare consequences,
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profit-maximizing.
We shall demonstrate th, desirability of cross-subsidization for
insurance firms, but it holds generally. This gives a further argument for
exclusivity, since if an individual purchases all his insurance from a
single carrier, the carrier can cross-subsidize between contracts. When
insurance against different risks is provided by different carriers, due to
regulation, diseconomies of scope, etc., then cross-subsidization between
carrier! is potentially welfare-improving. This is true even when the
government cannot impose taxes or subsidies directly on the quantity of
insurance purchased by an individual, because of costly monitoring, for
example.
To establish the desirability of cross-subsidization, we employ a model
in which there are two possible accidents, I and 2. The individual commits
himself to undertaking either project 1 or project 2 with equal
probability (e.g.. project 1 could be a sunny-day project, and project 2 a
rainy-day project) before expending any accident-prevention effort.
Accident I can occur only if the individual embarks on project 1, while
accident 2 only with project 2. Thus, the twoaccidentsare mutually
exclusive. But here theyarecx ante exclusive--the roll of the die to
determinewhich of the accidents cannot occur is made before the individual
makes his effort decision; while in the previous section, the mutual
exclusivity wasD2. We denote variables associated with project 1 by a
and with project2 with a
-
-Thus,the expected utility function is
EU —(G,(l-)+a1-;1+R,(L-?)÷1P-;) . (3.1)
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28Subsequently, we shall drop the .Weimpose a Lump-sun tax
S(possibly negative) on contracts providing insurance against accident I.
and use the proceeds to finance a lump-sum subsidy of S for contracts
providing insurance against accident 2.Thus, contracts 1 and 2 have the
budget constraints
- - S 0 ,and(l-P) -a?+ Sa - (3.2)
We wish to show that the optimal value of Sis not in general zero.
to isoLate the cross-subsidization market failure, we mustpurge the
model of other factors which could result in a non-zero optimal value for
S.First, since the effort decision for either accident is made when it is
known that the other accident cannot occur, the seemingLy unrelated events
externality is inoperative, and need not concern us. Second, if the
expected marginal utilities of income were different for the two projects,
a cross-subsidy would be desirable to equalize the expected marginal
utilities.(The cross-subsidy, in this case, is effectively a form of
insurance.) to isolate the cross-subsidization market failure, we want to
rule out this possibility, and so require that the expected marginal
utilities of income be the sale for both projects. Third, cross-
subsidization can be desirable because it provides an indirect form of z
(before the individual has made his effort decision) randomization,
when direct ex ante randomization is excluded (as in this paperY2° The way
we shall proceed is to prove that SO in general at the social optimum,
and then argue that this is not due to any considerations related to
randomization -




—1and (-0+1)P— 1 . (33)
Substituting (3.2) into (3.3). eliminating the fl's and totally
differentiating the resulting equations gives
A —( —--+j)?'





uo — —Ps —P. ______ i-P
85"G(0÷S)(.)2 as-i,(aS)(p)1 —4
(lP) P' (1.P)2
where the denominators are negative in the relevant range.
Next we set up the social optimization problem by substituting (3.2)
into (3.1) and treating the planner as choosing and S .The
corresponding first-order conditions are
A A A A A
a: (-u+u)P -u AF'—— 0 (3.Sa)
1-2 oa
(;-S) 3
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5: (-u+u)-__________ — -
— — — 0
(3.5c) l- as 1-p as
Note that (-u+u)P —- uwhere• (1-?)u+Puis the average
marginal utility of income. Multiply (3.Sa) by —and(3.5b) by -—- and





From (3.4), it follows that giving a subsidy retards effort, while
imposing a lump-sum tax stimulates it. The natural conjecture therefore is
that one wants to tax policies for which, damage fixed, the probability of
accident is more sensitive to the size of the subsidy, since doing so will
reduce the probability of that accident and the deadweight Loss associated
with it substantiaLly, while the subsidy provided on the other accident wiLl
increase its, probability only slightly. This intuition is supported by
(3.6). If we impose the requirement that the expected marginal utility of
income for the two projects be the same, then (3.6) reduces to —
Inthe absence of cross-subsidization, more insurance is provided against
that accident for which the elasticity of the accident probability with
respect to the amount of insurance provided, ceteris paribus, is lower.
Suppose this is accident 1. Then one expects that with £—0, G >tiand
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31therefore, from (3.6Lthat C0.whichicpI.ies that accident 1.
should be subsidized.
The above argument can be formalized by considering a speciaL case. in
which the two accidents are the same except with respect to the
probability-of-accident functions. Define 0 —- (thus0 is the
elasticity of the probability of having an accident with respect to a
the amount of insurance provided), and assume that:i)< < 0 •where0
and are constants when profits are zero, and ii) the probability-of-
accident functions differ in such a way that — ' whenS—O in
competitive equilibrium. Then (35a) and (3.5b), evaluated at 5—0 ,become
- + — 0,and (3.Sa')
: - + — 0 - (3.Sb)
Since C0 •then >iIQ . whichimplies that L—o < o
Note that this local cross-subsidization has a non-zero first-order effect
on expected utility.
Cross-subsidization may be desirable because it provides an indirect
forts of cx ante randomization. That is, it might be efficient to ex ante
randomize either or both the aàcident 1 and accident 2 contracts, but when
such direct randomization is not permitted, cross-subsidization between the
accident I. and accident 2 contracts may provide an indirect or second-best
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local cross-subsidization in the above example is independent of such
randomization considerations. To do this, we show that local2' ex ante
randomization of either contract has a zero first-order effect onexpected
utility.
Undertake any local cx ante randomization of the contract against
accident I. Arnctt and StigLitz [1988b] have shown that all the potential
gains from cx ante randomization can be obtained with two contracts. Thus,
without loss of generality, we may assume that the randomization entails two
contracts. Contract A occurs with probability Q and makes arbitrarily
small profits of ri —, whilecontract B occurs with probability (l-Q)
and makes a profit of —- .Bothcontracts A and B maximize





1- + U (w-d+a)FA-eA
and similarly for contract B.For both contracts, individuals choose effort
to maximize expected utility, which yields e —e(aA, ande3 —
e(a3,1I). Thus, we maywriteEUA —EU(a, 11A andEU3 —EU3(a3,III).
dEli ('8EUA A ÔEUA d114 1 18E13 da3 aEU3d113
Hence, — +. — —
J
+ (l-Q) r'+ -
Now,since aA and a3 are chosen to maximize expected utility,
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'dA—O an an
Sincethe above argument holds for any Q, it also holds for the
optimal Q. Thus, whether or not local cx ante randomization is desirable,
it has a zero first-order effect on expected utility. Since local cross-
subsidization has a non-zero first-order effect on expected utility, the
desirability of local cross-subsidization must be independent of
randomization considerations.
Thus, ceteris Daribus, insurance for accidents in which moral hazard is
more (less) severe than "average" should be taxed (subsidized) since doing
so stimulates "average" effort, thereby reducing the deadweight loss
associated with moral hazard.
4. Pecuniary Externalities Market Failure
Recall from the discussion in section 1 that the market failure here
arises because insurance firms fail to take into account that collectively
the amount of insurance they provide affects producer prices and profits,
which in turn affect
individuals' effort at accident avoidance. In the classic, competitive
economy, these pecuniary externalities "do not matter"- -they cause
transfers, but do not generate inefficiency. In economies with moral
hazard, however, shadow prices deviate from market prices. With
heterogeneous individuals, the marginal deadweight loss associated with an
extra dollar of consumption by Mr. A may be larger than that for Mr. 3. In
this case, the transfers generated by pecuniary externalities can alter the
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externalities matter"- -affect the efficiency of the economy- -when moral
hazard is present22
Rather than present a general characterization of the nature of the
inefficiency1 we shall, as in the previous two sections, develop a simpLe
example in which the cause of market failure is transparent.
We assume that there is only one type of risk and one consumer good.
Now, however, the accident repair industry does not have constant costs;
instead, the cost of repairing the damage from an accident is an increasing
function of the number of accidents. Ze assume, furthermore, that there are
two classes of individuals- -workers who have to drive and therefore face the
risk of accident, and rentiers who sit at home consuming the profits from
the accident-repair industry.23
The expected utility of workers is
EU —(1-p(eflu(w-$)+p(e)u(w-D'(p(efl+a)-e , (4.Ij
where D(p(e)) is the total cost of damage repairs as a function of the
number of accidents, with D' >0and D" 0 .Workerspay the marginal
cost, D'(p(e)) ,andchoose effort. ignoring the fact that .,heir collective
effort affects the price of damagerepairs.Thus,
p'(-u0+u1)
—1 ,whereu, —u(w-$)and u1 —u(w.D'+a) . (6.2)
Thisimplies e —e(a,$) ,whichsubstituted into (4.1) gives EU —V(a,$).
Competitive insurance firms, meanwhile, choose 2andfi, taking
(4.2)into account, but likeworkers ignoringthe endogeniety of the cost of
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zero profit constraint, i.e.
max V(a,$) s.t. C(,$)—fl(l-p).ap—0 . (4.3)
where B denotes the market budget constraint.
At this competitive equilibrium. renders obtain an income of I —D'p-
D Can the planner do better, given the same informational constraints as
the market? Suppose the planner provides the rentiers with I and then
chooses a and $.Theconsumer's choice of effort as a function of a
and $isthe same as before. The planner's resource constraint, however,
differs from firms'. It is
—$(l.p).ap-D(p)+D'(p)p
-I—0 . (4.4)
The market'! choice of aand$ischaracterized by
Va p+(a+$)p'
$ 3C










36Since i <0 •P>0
, < 0and <C •while >C
then > 30 at the competitive equilibrium unless D" —0
In a-flspacethe budget constraint perceived by the market is steeper
than the real resource constraint, which implies that the market under-
supplies insurance. Collectively, firms ignore that if they provide more
insurance, damage costs go up, which, since this is equivalent to a fall in
• stimulates effort. Thus, the market perceives the responsiveness of
effort to increased insurance to be greater than it actually is, and hence
provides too little insurance.
The externality identified here could be corrected in a variety of
ways. It would be internalized if both insurance and damage repairs were
provided by the same company; this is an extension of the exclusivity
requirement. Alternatively, the government could subsidize automobile
accident insurance, which in general equilibrium with the consumer good as
numeraire entails taxing repairs.
The exampl.e of this section was rather specific. The essential point
is that, with moral hazard, pecuniary externalities have real efficiency
effects that are ignored by the market. Thus, we term the inefficiency




For over a quarter of a century. the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics, the formalization of Adam Smith's invisibLe hand, have been the
central propositions in welfare economics. Though the informational
assumptions underlying the theorems were generally not made explicit,
intuitive discussions of the advantages of the market fàcussed on the
"informational economy" of the price system. This paper examined the
behavior of competitive markets under a particular informational hypothesis.
We postulated that there are many misfortunes against which individuals wish
to purchase insurance and the occurrence of which are affected by their
actions; moreover, insurance firms recognize that these actions, though not
directly observable, will be affected by the nature of the insurance
coverage provided.
These moral hazard problems are pervasive in the economy. They arise
not only in explicit insurance policies, but also in the implicit insurance
associated with labor markets (wages not equal to the marginal revenue
product), land markets (sharecropping), capital markets (with equity and
loan contracts, when there is a finite probability of default which can be
affected by the borrowers' actions) and product markets (product
guarantees), etc. We havecontendedin this paper that economies in which
these moral hazard problems are present contain numerous forms of potential
inefficiency and are essentially never constrained Pareto efficient. Our
analysis therefore casts serious doubt on the relevance of the fundamental
theorems of welfare economics, and on the basic results concerning the
efficient decentralizability of economies.
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prescriptive consequences.2' We discuss the descriptive consequences first.
As usual whenever there are externalities, there are private incentives for
the internalization of those externalities. Our theory provides arationale
for the kind of incerlinking of labor, land, and credit markets often --
observedin LDCs.(Indeed, our paper may be viewed as a generalization as
the earlier Braverman-Stiglitz [19821 results in this area,) It also
provides a rationale for firms to subsidize health care programs, which may
reduce the Losses associated with absenteeism and employer-financed health
insurance.Our analysis may also provide part of the explanation for why
insurance firms typically provide insurance against several different risks.
The intertemporal linkages, in particular the externalities between
insurance provided at different dates, provide part of the explanation for
long-term relations, for why individuals should work for the same employers
for many periods, or why the same bank should provide credit over several
periods. (See also Stiglitz and Weiss (1983].)
There is also the issue of the relationship between competitiveness and
exclusivity. Exclusivity is not conceptually inconsistent with full
competitiveness, provided each individual has perfect information regarding
the full set of insurance contracts offered before he signs a contract which
will cover all his risks for his entire life.2 In fact, however.
individuals are typically poorly informed at the time they sign their first
insurance policy, and gradually acquire more information through costly
search and by switching firms. Thus, there is a tradeoff between
competitiveness and extended exclusivity. How the market will resolve this
Arnott/S tiglitz: Welfare Economics
February.1989
39tradeoff is £difficultissue. But it seems safe to say that the market
will be characterized by imperfect competition, only partial exclusivity.
and constrained inefficiency.
Though we have identified a set of externalities which might lead to
exclusive relations among a pair of economic agents, possibly covering a
wide range of transactions (insurance covering various kinds of risks), the
enforcement of these exclusive relations is frequently either costly or
infeasible. As a result, in many insurance contexts, individuals obtain
insurance against a particular risk from a variety of sources. For example.
health insurance is provided not only by the individual's insurance firm,
since, if he is sick, his employer generally gives him sick leave and his
family will continue to provide him food and shelter. Theaphorism"a
friend in need isafriend indeed" can betranslated"true friends provide
insurance."There is a widespread view that a critical function of non-
market institutions is to remedy the deficiencies of markets. Elsewhere
(Arnott-Stiglitz, 1988d), we have shown that this need not be true; whether
the supplemental insurance provided by non-market institutions is welfare-
improving depends on whether these non-market insurance providers monitor
thelevel of care provided by the insured.
Theprescriptiveimplications of our results are somewhat more
ambiguous. Wewouldnot argue that we have established an overwhelming
case for government intervention wherever there is moral, hazard. What we
have established is that an ideal government can, through intervention,
improvethe performance of a market economy, as we have described it. But
actual governments are not ideal. The potential market failures we have
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government intervention exceed the costs. To estabLish this, it will be
necessary, on the benefit side, to obtain estimates of the deadweight losses
associated with the inefficiencies we have identified,26 and on the cost
side, to develop models of the public sector that capture the inefficiencies
to which j is prone. We suspect, however, that there are some instances
where government intervention may be warranted. In an earLier paper, for
instance, we showed how subsidies to fire extinguishers or taxes on
cigarettes may be welfare-enhancing.
In any case, the government is engaged in the provision of a variety of
forms of insurance, and our analysis indicates that it should take these
externalities into account in the design of public insurance programs.2'
Our analysis can be criticized in another way as overstating the case
for government intervention. Throughout the paper we ignored the
possibility that individuaLs and firms may privately contract or organize to
mitigate the moral hazard problems and to at least partially internalize
the externalities we have identified. Consider, for example, the case of a
construction firm whose accident insurance is experience-rated and in which
workers with a hangover have a significantly greater probability of
accident. Workers may collectively agree to restrict their alcohol
consumption on evenings before work, realizing that failure to do so will,
result in higher accident insurance premiums. Even though each worker would
have an incentive to renege on the agreement and even though monitoring and
enforcing strict compliance would be very difficult, social disapproval
directed at workers who came to the job hung over would be somewhat
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more anonymous and diffuse, there would be less compliance with agreed-to
safety standards.
The possibility that individuals may privately cooperate to mitigate
moral hazard and to partially internalize the externalities we have
identified raises the question: In this context, what advantages does
government have over coalitions of individuals? One is universality, along
with which come advantages of scale and scope in reaching, monitoring, and
enforcing agreements. For example, it is considerably cheaper to have the
police monitor reckless driving than it would be for each insurance company
to monitor its own clients' driving. Relatedly, it is much cheaper for the
government to decide on universal safety standards than it is for each firm
toreach agreement with its own workers on safety standards. A second
advantage the government has is the cower to tax. Suppose that as a result
of moral hazard, people smoke too much. While an insurance company can
"tax" smoking by making a clients premium dependent on his cigarette
consumption, to do this it has to monitor the client's cigarette
consumption, which is excessively costly. The government could imperfectly
monitor each individual's consumption of cigarettes at lower cost, by
requiring that storeowners record the identity of all cigarette purchasers.
But more cost-effective than this is for it to anonymously tax the sale of
cigarettes, which it can do because of universality. Because of
universality and the power to tax, the government could be considerably more
effective in internalizing the pecuniary externalities market failure than
the collectivity of firms. A third advantage is the government's monopoly
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42on comtulsion. Private contracting requires agreement among the parties.
whereas governments can compel. with no quid org aug. The inter-firm
transfers required to internaLize the cross-subsidization market faiLure
wouLd not be possible without compulsion. Finally, the government can and
does restrict the terms of private contracts, for instance the forms of
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1.Moral hazard-incentive problemsalso arise in imperfect capital markets,
even when individuals are not risk-averse. See Stiglitz-Weiss (1981]. The
welfare economics for that case is similar to that presented here.
2. These events, moreover, occur in many states of nature. This, by itself,
presents no serious problem.
3.Complete insurance equalizes marginal utilities of income across states
of nature. Solong as accidents donot affect the marginal utility of
income (atany income level), providing complete insurance eliminates all
incentives for accident avoidance. For a more complete analysis, see Arnott
and Stiglit: (l988aJ and (19871.
4.Becausethese externalities operate exclusively through the price system.
they aresometimesreferred to as pecuniary.
5.The welfareeconomics ofthe other case are treated in Arnott and
Stiglitz (198k]. tieuse the terms "observable" and "monitorable"
interchangeably,and whenever we useeitherwe assume verifiability. More
generally, it should be clearthat these are distinct concepts; an action
maybeobservable by the two partiesto a contract, butnot verifiable by a
third party, and therefore not legally enforceable. Enforcement in such
circumstances may rely on reputation mechanisms. For a discussion of this
distinction and its implications, see Newbery and Stiglitz (19871.
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466. This is equivalent to the individual purchasing insurance from more than
one company, subject to the requirements that each insurance company write
its insurance conditional on the insurance that the individual purchases
from all other companies.
7. Under these circumstances, the equilibrium insurance contract maximizes
the utility of the insured subject to the non-negativity constraint on
profits, and is therefore evidently efficient.
8. This paper ignores adverse selection effects in order to identify the
particular market inefficiencies which arise from moral hazard. It should
be clear that many of the inefficiencies which we identify here also relate
to markets with adverse selection.
9. Different levels of damage associated with the same type of accident are
treated as separate events.
10. Alternatively, we could have assumed that the government pays out 'these
profits and taxes as a Lump-sum payment to individuals. See footnotes 12
and 13 for how the analysis is modified.
11. It is perhaps unrealistic to assume that there are forms of insurance
for which the government can specify price but not quantity, but doing so
simplifies the analysis. The government may be able to indirectly control
the price through tax-subsidy instruments, but incorporating these indirect
controls complicates the analysis without changing the qualitative results.
12. If tax revenues plus profits, R, are distributed to individuals as
lump-sum payments, then (1.16) remains unchanged, but the derivative of V
now contains a term, the derivative of V with respect to income, times the
derivative of a. Ifthe government can impose lump-sum taxes, the feasibility constraint
(1.13) is dropped. The market equilibirium is still not Pareto efficient.
(See footnote 13.)
13. In the case where profits and tax revenues are rebated to individuals,
and lump-sum taxes can be imposed, the equation corresponding to (1.16)
takes on exa,tly the same form, but now A has the interpretation of the
expected marginal utility of income.
The derivatives will take on different values, because of the induced
income effects. The derivatives are now general equilibrium derivatives;
that is, for each value of, say, ,(andall the other parameters of the
model) we calculate the general equilibrium solution; as changes, each of
the variables characterizing the equilibrium changes; the magnitude of the
change is given by the general equilibrium derivative.
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smoking in bed0.
15. A decrease in automobil, insurance cay indice individuals to drive more
attentively, making them sufficiently more tired when they arrive at their
destination that they are more likely to fall asleep while smoking in bed
(that is. the marginal disutility of the effort required to undertake the
fire-accident avoidance activity is increased,)
16. Walking round the house at night checking that windows are locked (to
prevent burglary) facilitates checking that the wood-stove door is closed,
elements turned off, etc. (to prevent fire).
17. The first-order condition for e2is
((t-P1)(u0-u2) + PL(ul-u,)](.PZ') -1—0.
The increase in insurance against accident I stimulates e2 if it causes the
term in square brackets to increase. Since $ increases, ts0-u2 increases,
but since increases too, u1-u3 decreases, and which effect dominates
depends on whether the marginal utility of income falls more or less
rapidly as income increases,
18. The reason why we stress this is that if these state variables are
observable, then the terms of a policy will be made contingent on the
current val,ues of the stock variable, and there is no externality. For an
important example where this distinction is clearly significant, see Arnott
and Stiglitz (19851.
19. In the present model, where all individuals are identical, induced
changes in the demands for various goods may result in changes in producer
prices, and hence in profits. But any loss in welfare as a consumer from
an increase in a price is exactly offset by a gain in welfare as a shareowner.
20. In an earlier paper, we showed that equilibrium insurance contracts
may, under not restrictive conditions, be characterized by both ex ante and
cx Dost randomization. (Arnott and Stiglitz [1988b]).
21.If this conuition is satisfied, a lane amount ofcx ante randomization
maystillbe desirable. See Arnott and Stiglitz (l988b].
22. It is generally true that pecuniary externalities matter in economies
with distortions. The unobservability of effort, which gives rise to moral
hazard, may be viewed as a distortion when individuals are risk-averse.
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4823. We mayimagine that the consumer goods industry produces a single
consumer good with constant returns to labor. The price of the consumer
good is the numeraire, and the wage is determined as the marginal product in
this industry. In the car repair industry, labor is combined with some
other factor provided by rentiers. Each worker's labor supply is inelastic.
24. This paper has focused on those cases where the quantity of insurance
purchased is observable. When it is not, similar inefficiencies arise; in
addition, however, there is a further inefficiency associated with the
quantity of insurance purchased, which may be partially remedied by imposing
a tax on insurance purchases. This point is elaborated in Arnott and
Stiglitz [1988c)
25. The argument that markets may be efficient even with a single insurance
firm has much of the flavor of the contestability arguments that all that is
required for competitive-like outcomes (efficiency, zero profits) is
øotential competition. As Stiglitz (1988) has shown, even the slightest
sunk costs alter this conclusion. Markets will not be efficient, and
profits will not be zero.
26. Since adverse selection and moral hazard almost invariably appear
together, before such estimation is possible, it will be necessary to
develop the welfare economics of moral hazard adverse selection.
27. Adverse selection plays an important role, both in understanding the
institutional structure of markets involving risk and in designing
appropriate policies. It should be noted that adverse selection gives rise
to a set of market failures analogous to those we identified in the paper as
stemming from moral hazard. For example taxation of commodities and cross-
subsidization betweeninsurance policies can be employed to partially relax
self-selection constraints. Furthermore, as here, pecuniary externalities
alter the efficiency loss associated with adverse selection.These and




This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive
equilibrius with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section
compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social cpttmum in a
fairly general model, and identifies six types of market failure. Each of
the subsequent sections focuses on a particular market failure.
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